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Abstract: The barrier concept plays a central role in design and operation of safety critical processes. In plant 
design barriers are provided as means of prevention to avoid critical process conditions which may be harmful to 
the environment. In plant operations barriers may be established and maintained through control actions in order 
to limit the consequences of critical plant events 
The barrier concept has had a significant practical value for industry by guiding the design thinking of safety 
engineers. The provision of material barriers preventing the release of radioactive materials from the reactor core 
to the environment is accordingly a basic principle of nuclear safety design. The application of barriers is 
furthermore an integral part of the defence in depth principle applied by nuclear industry. Here several barriers 
are combined with reliability techniques such as redundancy and diversity to create systems with a high level of 
safety. Chemical industries apply similar techniques for protection of the environment against the release of toxic 
materials. 
The paper explores different ways barriers can be represented in Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM). One of 
the existing flow functions in MFM is a barrier function. It is shown that other barrier types can be represented 
and that their combination into barrier chains may be used to analyze and design levels of safety in automated 
processes. Suggestion for further research on barrier modeling with MFM are included. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of a barrier plays a central role in 
design and operation of safety critical processes. In 
process design barriers are provided as 
countermeasures to avoid critical process conditions 
which may be harmful to the environment. In plant 
operations and control barriers may be established 
and maintained through counteractions limiting the 
consequences of critical plant events. 
The barrier concept has had a significant practical 
value for industry by guiding the design thinking of 
safety engineers. The provision of material barriers 
preventing the release of radioactive materials from 
the reactor core to the environment is accordingly a 
basic principle of nuclear safety design. The 
application of barriers is furthermore an integral part 
of the defence in depth principle applied by nuclear 
industry [1]. The application of several barriers to 
build layered defence structures is here combined 
with reliability techniques such as redundancy and 
diversity to create systems with a high level of safety. 
Chemical industries apply similar techniques for 
protection of the environment against the release of 
toxic materials [2]. 
The barrier concept has also been the subject of 
study by systems analysts and researchers. A 
challenge faced by both analysts and researchers has 
been that the barrier concept, although useful, is not 
particularly well defined.  
The present paper will describe how MFM can be 
used to represent different types of barrier. The use of 
MFM for modeling safety barriers is a relatively 
unexplored research topic. The paper will present the 
status of current work on using MFM for modeling 
safety functions at DTU and show how it relates to 
existing research on barriers. Being the first paper on 
the topic it is also the aim to provide directions for 
further work.  
The barrier concept is included in Multilevel Flow 
Modeling (MFM) [3] as one of the flow functions 
used to compose functional structures representing 
the functions involved in processing material and 
energy flows. The use of barriers in MFM to 
represent safety aspects of the sodium cooled 
Japanese Monju nuclear plant is presented in Lind et. 
al. [4]. This model clearly reflects the use of the 
barrier concept to model safety features of nuclear 
power plant. It also demonstrates the principle of 
defense in depth by a series of barriers separating the 
functions of the primary and secondary sodium 
cooling loops and the water steam cycle. Yoshikawa 
et. al. [5] proposes that such an MFM model could be 
used for on line risk monitoring.  
We will show in the paper that MFM includes 
ways to represent other types of barrier which are 
relevant for capturing other aspects of safety in 
complex automated plants. First we will review 
current research on barriers and defence in depth. 
2. BARRIERS AND DEFENCE IN DEPTH 
The nuclear industry and other industries as well 
apply two basic safety design principles for the 
technical, organizational and the administrative 
functions in industrial plants. The first principle is to 
establish active or passive barriers against severe 
disturbances or hazards.  The second principle is 
“defence in depth” which implies that several barriers 
are connected in chains so that each chain should 
then be broken before the harmful incident occurs as 
illustrated in Fig. 1. These principles are applied in 
design of both hardware and software, in the planning 
of plant operation and in the overall qualitative 
assessment on management level. Control systems 
often serve as active barriers in the defence in depth 
structure.  
The barrier concept plays therefore a central role in 
the design and operational philosophy of safety 
related industries. However, the barrier concept is 
often used uncritical and without rigor and hinders 
therefore a more formalized analysis and evaluation 
of plant safety. The problem can be illustrated by Fig. 
1. Here each barrier (the vertical bars) in the defense 
structure (prevention, control, protection. mitigation) 
is implemented by a variety of different mechanisms. 
It becomes therefore difficult to define what the 
common characteristics of barriers are across all 
these mechanisms. Even though the barrier concept 
seems good for framing the safety problem it is 
accordingly too abstract to be useful for a more 
formal rigorous analysis. 
 
 
Fig 1. The principle of defense in depth 
 
2.1 Defining barriers 
 
An early influential study of the barrier concept 
was done by Haddon [6]. One of the aims among 
researchers has been to develop systematic 
techniques for barrier analysis which could be used 
by industry and its regulators in the assessment of 
plant safety [7]. Another interest has been to use 
barrier concepts in accident analysis [8]. 
Haddon’s analysis of countermeasure strategies 
mentions a whole range of ways to create barrier 
structures in a variety of practical contexts. Hollnagel 
extends the meaning of the concept to encompass 
several meanings including material, functional, 
symbolic and immaterial barriers. Petersen [9] see 
this variety of meanings as a problem for the analysis 
and proposed a causal model to clarify the concept. 
 
2.1.1 MORT 
According to the MORT (The Management 
Oversight and Risk Tree) system safety programme 
[7] the basic ingredients of an accident are : 
 
 the energy flow or environmental condition 
that does the harm; 
 the vulnerable people or objects that can be 
hurt by that energy flow or environmental 
condition; 
 the failure or lack of the barriers and 
controls that are designed to keep them 
apart; and  
 the events and energy flows that lead into 
the final accident phase. 
 
Like Haddon [6] the MORT programme uses an 
energy-barrier concept. A distinction is made between 
safety and control barriers. Safety barriers is 
concerned with control of unwanted energy flows and 
control barriers are concerned with the control of 
wanted energy flows. A barrier can be both a control 
barrier and a safety barrier. 
Examples of safety barriers are: protective 
equipment, guardrails, safety training, work permit, 
and emergency plans. Examples of control barriers 
are: conductors, approved work methods, job training, 
disconnect switch, and pressure vessels.  
Note that, compared to Haddon [6] the MORT 
programme generalizes the barrier concept. Haddon 
uses of the barrier concept only as a material 
separation of harmful energy and the target. 
The analytical description of barriers in the MORT 
programme is based on concepts such as function, 
location and type. The function of a barrier can be 
prevention, control or minimization. A barrier can be 
located on the energy source, between the source and 
the worker, on worker, and separation through time 
and space. The different types of barriers are physical 
barriers, equipment barriers, warning devices, 
procedures/work processes, knowledge and skill, and 
supervision.  
Furthermore, a strategy for dealing with hazards is 
described. The priority of actions is: 
1. Elimination through design selection. 
2. Installation of safety devices (barriers). 
3. Installation of warning devices for timely 
detection (barriers). 
4. Development of special procedures enabling 
the equipment operator to handle the situation 
(barriers). 
 
2.1.2 Barrier types 
Hollnagel has introduced a distinction between 
different barrier types and an extension in 
applications. He defines a barrier as an obstacle, an 
obstruction or a hindrance that may 1) prevent an 
action from being carried out or an event from taking 
place, or 2) prevent or lessen the impact of the 
consequences. Note that this definition marks a 
generalization of the concept of a barrier as it is not 
restricted to an energy-based concept. 
 
Hollnagel also distinguish between the barrier 
function defined as the specific manner by which the 
barrier achieves its purpose from a barrier system 
which is defined as the substratum or foundation for 
the barrier function, i.e. the organizational and/or 
physical structure without which the barrier could not 
be accomplished. 
Hollnagel define four barrier types: material, 
functional, symbolic and immaterial barriers. 
 
 Material barriers that physically prevent an 
action from being carried out or the 
consequences from spreading. Examples of 
material barriers are buildings, walls, fences 
and railings.  
 Functional (or active or dynamic) barriers 
that works by impeding the action to be 
carried out, for instance by establishing a 
logical or temporal interlock. A functional 
barrier effectively sets up one or more 
preconditions that have to be met before 
something can happen. Examples of 
functional barriers are: a lock (physical or 
logical) 
 Symbolic barriers that require an act of 
interpretation in order to achieve its purpose. 
Hence, such barriers presume an 
“intelligent” agent that can react or respond 
to the barrier.  
 Immaterial barriers that are not physically 
present in the situation but depend on the 
knowledge of the user to achieve their 
purpose. Immaterial barriers are usually also 
present in a physical form such as a book or 
a memorandum, but physically present when 
the use is mandated. 
The material and the functional barriers are relevant 
in relation to the prevention of an action of a physical 
system or the prevention of the happening of the 
consequences of such an action. Symbolic barriers 
are relevant for human machine interaction. But as 
we shall see later, symbolic barriers are also involved 
in MFM when modeling automated safety controls.   
2.1.3 Barriers and countermeasures 
Petersen developed a novel approach for the 
analysis of safety [9]. Here the barrier concept is 
substituted by a causal account based on 
countermeasures. The principle can be explained by 
Fig. 2 showing the conditions required for the 
execution of an action A by an agent and directed 
towards an object (patient). Assuming that the action 
A is not wanted, the figure can be used to identify all 
the countermeasures which can be used in order to 
prevent the action for being succeeding. We can 
ensure that the agent does not have the capability to 
act and we can ensure that the object is not liable to 
undergo the change resulting from A. These are 
conditions for the potentiality of the action. We can 
also ensure that there is no opportunity to act be 
separating the agent and object in time or space 
(opportunity) and we can ensure that conditions 
which trigger the action does not occur (the 
actualization). Note that several of these 
countermeasures can be used together to obtain a 
high level of safety. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Phases of an action [14] 
 
When MFM is used for modeling safety we will 
actually need both Hollnagel´s and Petersen´s barrier 
concepts. As will be demonstrated below we can 
relate to Hollnagel´s barrier types. The 
countermeasures introduced by Petersen are related 
to recent extensions of MFM with roles [12]. 
However, here we will only be able to provide a 
preliminary analysis highlighting some of these 
aspects.  
3. MULTILEVEL FLOW MODELLING 
3.1 Overview 
Multilevel flow modeling is a modeling 
methodology for process and automation design and 
for reasoning about fault management and control of 
complex plants. MFM concepts and symbols are 
shown in Fig. 3 including an extension with the 
concept of threat required for proper modeling of 
goals and functions required for safety. Recent work 
extends MFM with roles [12] but is not included here. 
The reader is referred to [3,11] for a detailed 
introduction to MFM.  
 
 
Fig. 3. MFM concepts with a safety related 
extension (threat). 
 It is seen that the flow functions in MFM includes 
a barrier concept. This barrier represents the function 
of a system which prevents the flow of material or 
energy. Since we will identify other types of barrier 
in MFM below this will be called a flow barrier. A 
mass flow barrier belongs clearly to Hollnagel 
category of material barriers. But energy flow 
barriers (e.g. heat insulation) do not seem to fit 
naturally in his categories. With some interpretation 
they may belong to functional barriers. 
But MFM includes other concepts such as suppress 
and destroy relations and trip and suppress control 
functions which we will show are related to the wider 
definition of barrier concepts introduced above. We 
need therefore to review the use of these MFM 
concepts in order to explain their relevance for 
modeling barriers.  
The first step in the review is a reconsideration of 
the meaning of objectives and means-end relations. 
This will lead to the introduction of threats in MFM. 
The concept of a threat clarify the proper use of 
suppress and destroy relations and of the safety 
related control functions in MFM. The second step is 
to show the relevance of these results for representing 
different types of barriers in MFM. 
We need also a third step considering the levels of 
knowledge representation in MFM introduced in the 
analysis of causal reasoning presented in [13]. As part 
of this analysis event barriers were identified but not 
included in the paper. They will be discussed below.  
 
3.2 Reviewing the meaning of MFM objectives 
 
An objective in MFM represents a desirable future 
or existing situation or state. Objectives are related to 
the functions provided by the plant designer which 
are the means to produce or maintain the objective. 
The means-end relations produce and maintain are 
available in MFM and are used to represent situations 
where an agent seeks to promote a situation which is 
desirable. This desirable situation is expressed in the 
objective.  
It is realized that objectives and the produce and 
maintain relations are constituents of the same 
conceptual scheme dealing with promoting desirable 
situations. Within this scheme there are two possible 
syntactical combinations shown in Fig. 4 (the label 
xx refer to the so-called main function inside the flow 
structure fs1).   
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Means-end relations for promoting 
objectives 
 
MFM make also distinctions between process 
objectives and control objectives. The distinction 
between these two types of objectives is not reflected 
in separate modeling concepts or symbols but 
reflected by the context in which they appear as 
shown in Fig. 5. 
The control functions in Fig. 5 (pco1 and mco1) 
promote the achievement of process objectives (obj1 
and obj2). The control objectives (cob1 and cob2) 
specifies requirements to the means and manner of 
control. The syntax of control structures are described 
in [11]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Control structures in MFM include both 
process and control objectives. 
 
3.3 Introduction of threats 
 
Objectives are accordingly situations or states 
which are being promoted by the decisions of the 
process designer or the actions of a control agent. 
However designing or acting for reasons of safety 
deal with avoiding harmful situations. Such situations 
are obviously not promoted but opposed by proper 
actions. We need therefore also to consider actions 
which oppose situations or states which imply a risk 
or are undesirable by being in conflict with the values 
of the designer or the control agent.  
These situations or states will be called threats and 
represented by a black circle in MFM (see Fig. 3). 
Like an objective, a threat is referring to a situation or 
state. But unlike an objective which refers to a 
desirable situation, a threat refers to something which 
is undesirable or a hazard. The distinction between 
objectives and threats express value related 
preferences of the process designer or the control 
agent. Objectives and threats share a common 
property of being situations which are the target of 
the designer’s decisions and the agent action. We 
have therefore introduced a super-ordinate concept 
“target” as part of the generic MFM concepts (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 6 shows how threats are combined with destroy 
and suppress relations and the means or 
countermeasures used to oppose them (the main 
functions labeled “xx”).  
The concept of threat introduced here is related to 
the countermeasures provided by the designer. Threats 
can also be defined in an operational context in 
relation to the evaluation of dynamic situations e.g. in 
the management of alarms [15] but will not be 
addressed here.  
  
Fig. 6. Means-end relations used to represent 
connections between countermeasures (the means) 
and threats (the undesirable ends). 
 
3.3.1 Inconsistent intentions 
By the introduction of threats we can ensure the 
consistency of representations of intentional structures 
in MFM. Intentions are considered consistent if they 
are rational in the sense that there is no conflict 
between the end and the means taken to achieve the 
ends.  
We can illustrate this idea of consistency by Fig. 7 
showing four schematic MFM models which are 
inconsistent. The structures shown in Fig. 4, 5 and 6 
are consistent. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. MFM models representing inconsistent 
intentions. 
 
Models A and B in Fig. 7 are inconsistent because a 
rational agent would not produce or maintain a 
situation or state which is a threat (except for sabotage 
which we exclude here). In a similar way the models C 
and D should be considered inconsistent because a 
rational agent would not destroy or suppress a 
situation which is an objective.  
Note that there may be conflicts among two agents 
if the objective of one of the agent is a threat for the 
other agent. Such situations are not inconsistent and 
would be relevant to consider in future research but 
will not be discussed further here.     
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Control functions contribute to elimination 
(A)  or suppression (B) of threats 
 
3.3.2 Threats and control functions 
Control functions in MFM [11] can also be 
combined with threats as shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. 
The control functions in Fig. 8 contribute to the 
elimination (a) or suppression (b) of threats thr1 and 
thr2. In Fig. 9 the control functions suppress situations 
with unstable dynamics in a steering (a) and a 
regulation (b) control task (the threats cthr1 and 
cthr2).  
Control structures can accordingly be connected 
with both objectives and threats at the same time and 
thereby reflect the typical complexity of a control 
situation which often includes process states that 
should be promoted and opposed in combination with 
situations of instability (threats) which should be 
avoided or eliminated. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Threats can also relate to the performance of 
control functions. 
 
3.3.3 Threats and conditions 
Enablement and disablement conditions can be 
combined with objectives as shown in Fig. 10 (A and 
B). Threats also combine with enablement and 
disablement as shown (C and D).  
 
 
Fig.10. A flow function can be conditioned 
(enabled or disabled) by an objective or a threat. 
 
3.4 Levels of representation in MFM 
 
It has been shown in [13] that the knowledge 
provided for causal reasoning in a MFM model 
related to four separate but interdependent levels of 
specification. An overview of these levels is 
presented in Table 1.  
On the most fundamental level 1 state dependency 
relations represent cause-effect and logic relations 
between states of process objectives and functions. 
On level 2 we find influence, means-end and control 
relations which are used to represent potentials for 
interaction between states of objectives and functions. 
They comprise a separate level of representation 
which is more abstract than level 1 by only indicating 
the existence of a state dependency relation between 
two flow functions and not the specific state 
dependency relations which are represented on level 
1.  
  
Table 1. Process knowledge in MFM is organized into four 
levels of specification 
Level Knowledge category 
4 Paths Event propagation paths 
3 Patterns Influence 
patterns 
Means-end 
and control 
patterns 
2 Relations Influence 
relations 
Means-end 
and control 
relations 
1 Dependenc
ies 
State dependency relations 
 
Of particular importance for the present paper is 
the distinction between the two types of influence 
relations “influencer” and “participant” on level 2 
(see Fig. 3). The participant relation is used in 
situations where the state of a transport function is 
independent on changes in the state of the functions it 
is connected with through the participant relation. 
This means that a change in the state of a storage 
function or a barrier which is connected with the 
transport through a participant relation cannot 
propagate to the transport. This means that the 
participant relation can be seen as an event barrier.    
On level 3 we find influence and means-end 
relations combining functions and goals into MFM 
patterns on level 3. MFM patterns are generic 
combinations of goals and functions and are the 
building blocks of propagation paths on level 4. 
 
3.5 Event barriers 
 
Event propagation within a flow-structure reflects 
the general behavior of mass and energy flow 
systems. It is derived from the bidirectional 
propagation of events between storage, balance, 
transport and barrier flow functions. 
Event propagation paths determine the potential 
for interaction between plant functions and are 
therefore relevant for both process and control system 
design or in general for reasoning about dynamic 
situations dealing with the confinement and control 
of disturbances. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. An example illustrating the use of 
influence relations (ca7, pa9, ca8, pa10 and pa11) in a 
flow structure. 
 
Flow functions are interconnected within flow 
structures by two types of influence relations called 
direct and indirect influences (Fig. 11). The 
influences define a potential for interaction between 
flow functions. They do not define the actual 
dependencies between states of the functions which 
are defined by state dependency relations (level 1).  
Direct influences represent situations where a 
change in the state of a transport function has an 
effect on the state of its neighboring storage or 
balance functions. Direct influences are exemplified 
in Fig. 11 by considering the effects of a changed 
flow in transport function tra9 on its neighboring 
storage functions sto2 and sto3.  
Assuming that the flow provided by tra9 is 
changed the state of storage sto2 and sto3 is changed. 
These influences on the state of sto2 and sto3 caused 
by changes in tra9 are called direct influences and are 
expressions of the potential of transport functions for 
changing mass or energy balances. The arrow inside 
the transport function tra9 is an explicit 
representation of the direct influence which go in 
both upstream and downstream directions (tra9 will 
influence sto2 upstream and sto3 downstream).  
Direct influences are only mentioned here in order 
to distinguish them from indirect influences which 
are highly relevant for the present discussion of 
barriers. More details about the causal implications of 
direct influences can be found in [13].  
An indirect influence represents a situation where 
the change of the state of a storage or a balance may 
have an effect on the state of their connected 
transport functions. Indirect influences represent 
accordingly interactions between potential and 
actualized changes in mass or energy flows. As an 
example, if the content of mass in sto3 in Fig. 11 is 
changing it may influence the transport tra10 by 
changing the flow rate. The accumulated mass in sto3 
represents a potential for flow and the resulting 
change in the transport tra10 is its actualization. This 
indirect influence of sto3 on the state of tra10 is 
represented by an arrow pointing from sto3 towards 
tra10 (ca9 in Fig.11). Since the storage actively 
influences the transport the relation is called an 
influencer. In other situations storages will not 
influence the state of the transports but passively 
deliver or receive the flows. This type of indirect 
influence is represented in MFM by a so-called 
participant relation depicted as a directed relation 
with a box indicating the transport function in 
question (pa9, pa10 and pa11 in Fig. 11). 
 
3.5.1 Patterns of indirect influence 
Influence relations combine MFM flow functions 
into patterns of indirect influence (level 3 in table 1) 
which are basic building blocks of event propagation 
paths (level 4). Influence patterns are divided into 
two main groups. In one group the patterns are 
composed of two flow functions which are related by 
an influence relation. The other group comprising 
patterns with two or more transport functions and/or 
barriers connected to a balance are discussed by Lind 
[13] but will not be discussed here. Furthermore we 
will also ignore patterns with influencer relations 
since they are irrelevant for the present discussion 
about event barriers. In the following we will 
accordingly only discuss the patterns of indirect 
influence created by participant relations.   
The possible patterns with two flow functions 
connected by a participant relation are shown in table 
2. The combinations are restricted by the MFM 
syntax which does not allow interconnections of e.g. 
two transport or two storages etc. The syntax defines 
combinations of functions which are meaningful in 
the sense of process semantics.  
 
Table 2. MFM Patterns with transport, barrier, 
storage, balance, source or sink functions connected 
with a participant relation.  
    
    
 
We will show in the following that these patterns 
in some cases prevent changes of the state in one of 
the flow functions to propagate to the other one in the 
pattern.  These cases define accordingly a set of 
event barriers. We will also show that the event 
barriers combine in chains. The event barriers 
introduced below fit in the category of functional 
barriers in Hollnagel´s taxonomy.  
 
3.5.2 Upstream and downstream propagation 
MFM distinguish between propagation of changes 
in upstream or downstream directions [13]. The 
distinction is related to the direction of mass or 
energy flow which is indicated in the transport 
function. The distinction is important because events 
can propagate in the same direction as the flow 
(downstream) or it can propagate in the opposite 
direction (upstream). The two situations lead to 
different event barriers and will be therefore be 
discussed separately.     
 
3.5.2.1 Upstream event barriers 
We have here identified three different situations 
from table 2 involving event barriers (Fig. 12). 
The cases are:  a) preventing propagation of a 
storage event upstream to a connected transport 
function, b) preventing  propagation of a balance 
event upstream to a connected transport function, and 
c) preventing propagation of a storage event to a 
connected barrier. A brief explanation of each case is 
given below. 
 
Fig. 12. Upstream event barriers 
Storage and transport (a)  
A storage event (i.e. a change of its state) cannot 
propagate upstream to the connected transport. This 
lack of influence on the state of the transport is what 
the participant relation (pa1) signifies. This pattern 
accordingly represents an event barrier.  
 
Balance and transport (b) 
A balance event (e.g. a leak or unbalance) cannot 
propagate upstream by influencing the state of 
transport functions. This lack of influence on the state 
of the transport is what the participant relation (pa1) 
signifies. This pattern accordingly represents an event 
barrier.  
 
Storage and barrier(c) 
A storage event cannot here propagate upstream by 
influencing the state of a connected barrier (similar to 
a). This lack of influence on the state of the transport 
is what the participant relation (pa1) signifies. This 
pattern accordingly represents an event barrier.  
 
3.5.2.2 Upstream event barrier paths 
It is clear that upstream event barriers combine 
into barrier paths as exemplified in Fig. 13 where a 
storage (sto1) event is prevented from propagating to 
the connected transport (tra2) and where a leak in the 
balance (bal1) is prevented from propagating to the 
next transport (tra1) upstream. Note that an upstream 
path is always is associated with a node from where 
the event is assumed to originate (here sto1). 
These barriers paths are of interest in 
understanding interactions between several barriers 
and the principles involved in building defence in 
depth structures.  
 
 
 
Fig. 13. An upstream event barrier path combining 
patterns in Fig. 12 
 
Of particular interest would be to develop rules for 
reasoning about event barrier failures. Thus the 
consequence of a failure of the barrier related to pa3 
in Fig. 13 would be that the storage event propagates 
to the transport function tra2. This event would then 
transfer to the first transport tra1 through the balance 
bal1 but is prevented by pa1. These rules for 
reasoning about barrier failure are presently not 
included in the reasoning systems for MFM based 
root cause analysis under development [13]. 
 
3.5.2.3 Downstream event barriers 
As for upstream propagation we will also here 
consider three different cases of event barriers. They 
are shown in Fig. 14. 
The cases are: a) preventing propagation of a 
storage event downstream to a connected transport 
function, b) preventing propagation of a balance 
event downstream to a connected transport function, 
and c) preventing propagation of a storage event to a 
connected barrier. A brief explanation of each case is 
given below. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Downstream event barriers. 
 
Storage and transport (a)  
A storage event (i.e. a change of its state) cannot 
propagate downstream to the connected transport. 
This lack of influence on the state of the transport is 
what the participant relation (pa1) signifies. This 
pattern accordingly represents an event barrier.  
 
Balance and transport (b) 
A balance event (e.g. a leak or unbalance) cannot 
propagate downstream by influencing the state of 
transport functions. This lack of influence on the state 
of the transport is what the participant relation (pa1) 
signifies. This pattern accordingly represents an event 
barrier.  
 
Storage and barrier(c) 
A storage event cannot here propagate downstream 
by influencing the state of a connected barrier 
(similar to a). This lack of influence on the state of 
the transport is what the participant relation (pa1) 
signifies. This pattern accordingly represents an event 
barrier.  
 
 
Fig. 15. A downstream event barrier path 
combining barriers in Fig. 14. 
 
3.5.2.4 Downstream event barrier paths 
The downstream event barriers in Fig. 14 combine 
into barrier paths as exemplified in Fig. 15 where a 
storage (sto1) event is prevented from propagating 
downstream to the connected transport (tra1) and 
where a leak in the balance (bal1) is prevented from 
propagating to the transport (tra2) upstream. Note 
that a downstream path is always is associated with a 
node from where the event is assumed to originate 
(here sto1).  
As mentioned above, these barrier paths and the 
rules for their composition are of interest in 
understanding interactions between several barriers 
and for the development of formalized principles for 
analysis and construction of levels of defence.  
 
 
 
3.6 Other barrier types in MFM 
 
In the following we will explain how MFM can 
represent other types of barrier. 
Two of the control functions in Fig. 3 can actually 
be seen as barriers. This is illustrated by Fig. 16 
(identical to Fig. 8) which includes two simplified 
MFM models containing destroy or trip (dco1) and 
suppresses (sup1) control functions. The trip function 
(dco1) eliminates the threat (thr1) and is therefore a 
barrier against counteragents which otherwise may 
realize the threat. Similarly, the suppress function 
(sup1) prevents that the threat thr2 becomes realized 
by acting as a barrier against counteragents. The 
inclusion of disturbances in MFM models are 
discussed by Heussen [16]. 
The trip and suppress control functions should 
accordingly be seen as a barriers. Both of these 
barriers belong to Hollnagel’s functional category.  
 
 
Fig. 16. Control structures in MFM models include 
symbolic and functional barriers (according to 
Hollnagel’s types). 
 
The threats themselves may also be seen as 
barriers as they require an act of interpretation in 
order to achieve their purpose. In MFM this 
interpretation is expressed by the type of control 
function related to the threat. 
In summary, each of the examples (a and b) in Fig. 
16 contains two barriers. The first barrier is the threat 
which is symbolic as it requires interpretation by the 
control agent in order that the corresponding situation 
is eliminated (a) or prevented (b). The control 
functions (dco1 and sco1) are the countermeasures 
provided against the threat and is therefore the 
second barrier.  
The MFM representations of barriers in Fig. 16 
accordingly signify that two measures are taken by 
the system designer to prevent a threatening situation. 
The first is to inform a potential control agent that the 
situation is a threat (and not an objective). The 
second is that a control action is provided to cope 
with the threat. 
Above we have discussed the various ways by 
which MFM can represent barriers. It has been  
concluded that the barrier types included in MFM 
may be seen as instances of the more abstract barrier 
types defined in Hollnagel’s taxonomy.  
 
4 DEFENCE IN DEPTH AND MFM 
In the following we will discuss the relevance of 
the findings presented above for the principle of 
defence in depth [1]. We will focus exclusively on the 
idea of providing levels of defence in the plant and its 
control systems. We will not discuss aspects related 
to diversity and the distinctions between functional 
and structural redundancy even though these aspects 
also may be addressed by MFM (see e.g. [12]). 
 
4.1 An Example   
 
We will use a simple process example to 
demonstrate how MFM can combine barriers and 
represent their interrelations. The example shown in 
Fig. 17 is a generic heat transfer system and is taken 
from [4]. This system has been used to build an MFM 
model of the MONJU nuclear power plant which has 
several interacting heat transfer subsystems of this 
type. 
 
 
Fig. 17. A generic heat transfer system 
The heat transfer system contains two heat 
exchangers HE1 and HE2 connected with a water 
circulation loop. The purpose of the water loop is to 
transfer heat from the secondary side of HE1 to the 
primary side of HE2. The water is circulated by a 
pump. The circulation flow is controlled by a control 
system CON1. An MFM model of the example as 
shown in Fig. 17 is presented in [4].  
For the purpose of the present discussion the 
example will be extended by assuming that there is a 
risk of overheating the fluid on the secondary side of 
HE2. An additional safety related control system is 
therefore provided to monitor the temperature and 
respond with protective actions if the temperature 
gets too high. We will assume that the control system 
will change the setpoint of the flow controller. This 
additional control system is not shown in Fig. 17.  
Fig. 18 show the MFM model with the extensions 
required to include the temperature controller. The 
extensions comprise the control structure cfs2 
modeling the temperature controller including the 
threat thr1 which may be expressed by a temperature 
limit (related to the accumulation of heat in HE2 
represented by the energy storage function sto4. The 
temperature control system is actuating (ac2) the 
transfer of energy (tra1) inside the pump.  
 
Fig. 18. MFM model of the generic heat  
transfer system including a control system 
suppressing high temperature in HE2. 
 
4.1.2 Barrier types in the example 
It is realized that the MFM model contains several 
barrier types.  First of all there are two flow barriers 
included in the mass flow structure mfs1. These two 
barriers represent the functions of the piping inside 
HE1 and HE2 respectively. These pipes prevent the 
fluid contained in the primary side of the heat 
exchangers to enter their secondary side. It is also 
seen that the amount of water accumulated in the 
circulation loop (the state of sto2) will not affect the 
barriers such as creating a leak due to the pressure 
created (indicated by pa6 and pa9). 
In addition to the flow barriers in mfs1 we also see 
several examples of event barriers in in efs2 and efs1. 
Two examples of particular interest are the event 
barriers defined by the participant relations pa13 and 
pa14 and the flow functions they connect in energy 
flow structure efs2. These event barriers show that 
changes in the energy transferred from the secondary 
side of HE1 (sto3) to the primary side of HE2 (sto4) 
can only be performed by changing in the circulation 
flow (tra1, tra4 to tra11 following the means-end 
relations between efs1, mfs1 and efs2).  
This illustrates that MFM model can be used to 
study the interaction between different types of 
barrier in the system (ignoring the fact that the 
somewhat counter intuitive result of the analysis may 
indicate that the model is not entirely correct!).  
We also see that the temperature controller 
introduce two barriers as explained above i.e. the 
threat (thr1) and the control function (con2). It is 
realized that these two barriers are interrelated with 
the energy flow barriers in efs1 mentioned above 
through a chain of means and ends incorporating the 
a chain of means-and ends including the pumping, 
circulation and energy transfer functions. 
The MFM model can accordingly reflect 
composite barrier structures in a system. However, it 
is also seems as if the organization of the barriers not 
always can be described as simple chains or levels of 
defense. More complex structures are to be involved. 
MFM may be an efficient tool for the analysis and 
design of these structures.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is of an exploratory nature. It 
investigates how MFM can be used to model barriers 
and analyze defence in depth in safety critical process. 
The paper is the first published on this topic.  
The paper demonstrates that MFM models can 
represent several barrier types and their composition 
in levels of defence. The concept of threat is 
introduced as an extension of MFM. The extension 
was required in order to clarify the semantics and to 
be able to extend the barrier types covered by MFM.  
Further research work is required including also 
the development of rules for reasoning about barrier 
structures and their failures. This research is required 
in order to make MFM useful as a tool for systematic 
analysis and design of level of defence.  
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